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Abstract  
This paper examines the monitoring of third party education agents employed in international 
student recruitment. Agency theory identifies comprehensive monitoring as one way to ensure 
that agents work in the principal’s best interest. By analysing best practice guidelines, this paper 
investigates the monitoring mechanisms proposed for education providers to mitigate 
information asymmetry in their education agent relationships. The findings from the analysis 
suggest that following the existing guidelines would only allow client institutions to partially 
observe the behaviour of their agents. Hence, education providers should be not only guided 
towards more intensive use of the existing techniques but also encouraged to adopt new 
techniques, such as mystery shopping, to better determine education agents’ true behaviour.  
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The use of third-party education agents in international student recruitment is a widely used market 
entry strategy (Coffey & Perry, 2013; Havergal, 2015; Huang, Raimo, & Humfrey, 2016; Independent 
Commission Against Corruption {ICAC}, 2015; Observatory of Borderless Higher Education {OBHE}, 
2014). Education agents are perceived as a type of ‘indirect exporting’, representing a ‘low equity - low 
control’ export option (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Goi, 2015; Li & Roberts, 2012). Conformingly, the 
reasons for contracting education agents are often based on the desire to increase market presence 
without a high level of upfront investment, whilst many of the pertinent risks are linked to the limited 
abilities of education providers’ to control the behaviour of their agents (Coco, 2015; Coffey & Perry, 
2013; Galbraith & Brabner, 2013; ICAC, 2015; Queensland Government, 2009; Raimo, Humfrey, & 
Huang, 2015). Examples of the issues frequently reported in the literature are situations breaching the 
interests of the students, such as misleading information and financial fraud; situations breaching the 
interest of the education providers, such as manipulation of the application process or limited 
effectiveness (Table 1), as well as situations breaching the wider national interests (c.f. Nikula & Kivistö 
2017).  
The popularity of education agents as a foreign entry market strategy and the above mentioned pertinent 
risks highlight education providers’ responsibility to overcome these low control conditions. The agency 
theory suggests that one of the essential factors in efficient third-party control is the ability of the principal 
to monitor the behaviour of the agent (Kiser, 1999; Kivistö, 2008). The extant literature on education 
agent management is scare in understanding the monitoring abilities of education providers, and mainly 
reports on the used monitoring techniques and discusses other control tools  (Coco, 2015; Coffey & Perry, 
2013; Huang et al., 2016; O’Connel, 2012; Raimo et al., 2015). To address this gap, this paper examines 
the set of monitoring tools proposed for this industry and investigates the extent to which these tools, 
independently and interdependently, allow education providers to ascertain the common issues 
identified in this industry. 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section will analyse the role of monitoring in education 
provider–-agent relationships from the perspective of the agency theory. The third section will introduce 
the research design, which will be followed by discussion and critical analysis of the results. 
 
2 Agency Theory: perspectives on education agents 
 
Nikula and Kivistö (2017) have suggested that agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973) 
provides a useful framework for analysing the relationship between education providers and their 
contracted education agents. Agency theory investigates relationships between two parties where one 
party (the principal) engages the other (the agent) to perform tasks on their behalf. The key assumption 
is that after delegation of authority, a principal is likely to encounter problems in controlling the agent 
behaviour. The logic behind this assumption is that the agent’s interests and goals are likely to differ from 
those of the principal and that agents often have better information than the principals about their actions 
related to the assigned tasks (information asymmetry) (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Kivistö, 2008).  
The assumptions outlined above are present in the education provider–agent relationships1.  The interests 
of education providers and agents are only partially aligned as the profit-oriented nature of the agent’s 
operation does not align directly with the goals of client institutions, especially in relation to student 
quality (Nikula & Kivistö, 2017). At the same time, conditions such as geographic distance and language 
barriers accentuate information asymmetries across industries, making monitoring difficult (Dant & Nasr, 
1998; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995; Kim, Prescott, & Kim, 2005; Roth & 
O’Donnell, 1996; Yi, Teng, & Meng, 2018). The non-repetitive nature of end-customers (i.e. students) is 
also likely to increase agency hazards in this industry (Gómez, González, & Suárez, 2011).  
                                                          
1 This paper will focus on ‘institution-contracted, for-profit actors assisting in recruiting international students in 
exchange for compensation paid by the institution(s)’ (Nikula & Kivistö, 2017, p. 5). The monitoring of these formal 
relationships can be considered as education providers’ first priority. However, the insights from this paper should 
be largely useful for monitoring other type of agents (Altbach & Reisberg, 2013; Coffey & Perry, 2013; Ministry of 
Education, 2015a; Nikula & Kivistö, 2017; Roy, 2017). 
 
The principal has two options for mitigating the moral hazard problem resulting from conflicts of 
interests and information asymmetries: increasing agent monitoring efforts and/or offering incentives 
that are as compatible as possible with the goals of the principal. A limited body of academic literature 
has investigated education providers’ perspectives on different incentives and/or contracts in education 
agent management (e.g. Coco, 2015; Huang et al., 2016; O’Connel, 2012), but there are few, if any, 
studies elaborating the effectiveness of different monitoring techniques and monitoring caveats in this 
industry.  
The insufficiency of the standard financial incentives (e.g. ICAC, 2015) and the limited power of contracts 
(Huang et al., 2016; O’Connel, 2012) in controlling education agents, emphasises the need to better 
understand the role of monitoring in education provider-agent relationships. Furthermore, there 
appears to be major gaps in many education providers’ extant monitoring practices. Some providers 
argue that it is impossible to monitor the activities of their education agents or admit that they have not 
established systematic monitoring frameworks (Australian Government, 2010; Coffey & Perry, 2013; 
Huang et al., 2016; Ministry of Education, 2015a, 2015b). Others have been found to be unaware of how 
their agents actually behave (Coco, 2015; Coffey & Perry, 2013; Galbraith & Brabner, 2013; Matthews, 
2012). For instance, in 2012 a questionnaire sent to UK universities revealed that 70% of the 
respondents had limited understanding of whether their agents charged fees from recruited students, 
and 80 % of respondents did not know whether the agents communicated the exact nature of the 
representation to the students (Matthews, 2012).  
The objective of this study is to investigate the range of monitoring methods proposed for education 
providers vis-a-vis the insights derived from agency theory and other literature discussing third party 
monitoring techniques and critically evaluate whether the monitoring methods allow education 
providers to observe the key problems identified in education agent behaviour to address the pervasive 
information asymmetries. The next section will discuss the research design. 
 
3 Research Design 
 
To evaluate how education providers are advised to observe the true behaviour of their agents, this 
paper was set to review available industry-specific best practice guidelines published within the past 
decade (January 2008 – March 2018) from the UK, Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and 
Canada. These countries are key users of education agents and together host more than half of all 
international student tertiary level enrolments in OECD countries (OECD, 2014, 2017).  
The search for documented guidelines began with a review of government and major industry body 
websites. Internet searches (with keywords such as ‘education/recruiting agent’ and ‘best practice’, 
‘management’ or ‘monitoring’) and the snowballing technique (scanning of references of retrieved 
documents) were extensively used and select organisations were contacted to enquire about the 
existence of additional guidelines. Documents that did not propose sufficient examples of monitoring 
techniques were excluded. The final best practice guideline dataset consisted of eight documents 
published by government agencies or well-known industry bodies (Table 2). An additional five 
documents reporting on providers’ existing control practices were included in the dataset. These second 
layer documents included two doctoral dissertations and three reports that were produced, 
commissioned or funded by government agencies. The second layer was included to provide a sample of 
actual monitoring techniques from the case countries. Therefore, it does not aim being representative of 
all providers’ practises nor a comprehensive list of available documents reporting on extant practices. 
The documents were analysed through qualitative content analysis (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Schreier, 2012). 
A monitoring tool analysis grid was based on a review of the agency theory and market entry mode 
literature identifying different monitoring techniques used by principals to detect deviation in agent 
behaviour (Bradach, 1997; Cassou, Cliquet, & Perrigot, 2017; Combs, Michael, & Castrogiovanni, 2004; 
Dant & Nasr, 1998; Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995; Gómez et al., 2011; Kidwell & Nygaard, 2011; 
Kidwell, Nygaard, & Silkoset, 2007; Roth & O’Donnell, 1996). Next, deductive pattern matching was 
performed: all the documents were read multiple times and relevant examples from the documents 
were recorded in the matching categories (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). All document sections discussing agent 
selection (due diligence before contracting) were excluded as this study focused only on the monitoring 
of existing relationships (moral hazard), and not on adverse selection agency problems. An ‘other’ 
category was created to include a more inductive way of recording the data. Because of its frequent use, 
an additional ‘peer sharing’ category was created to capture situations where monitoring was based on 
communication with other principals using the same agent.  
Even though a comprehensive review of available guidelines was undertaken, some relevant documents 
may not have been identified. Further, best practices may be shared via non-published fora excluded 
from the data, such as conference presentations, consultations, and workshops. However, overall the 
limited number of documents identified is believed to reflect the scarce literature and data available 
about the education provider–agent relationship (Huang et al., 2016; PhillipsKPA, 2005; Reisberg & 
Altbach, 2011) and the ‘limited documentation freely available to education providers to assist them in 
managing risks associated with Education Agent management’ (VTI, 2010, p. 4). 
Another limitation of this study is that narrowing the scope of data collection to documents published in 
select English-speaking countries presents only a partial picture of the best practice guidelines. The use 
of education agents has now become a global phenomenon, and client institutions can be found in many 
non-English speaking countries (c.f. Nikula & Kivistö, 2017; OBHE, 2014). Hence, the findings may have 
limited external validity outside the case countries, and further research should include similar guides 
from elsewhere. Nevertheless, the findings from this study do offer important insights as the selected 
group of countries is responsible for a significant share of the total global international enrolments. 
 
4 Evaluation of the monitoring tools proposed in the best practice guidelines 
 
The importance of monitoring education agents’ behaviour is outlined in all the best practice guides, 
prompting education providers to maintain an ‘ongoing process to monitor’ (NZQA, 2016, p. 8) or to 
commit to ‘regularly monitoring and assessing the agencies’ (West & Addington, 2014, p. 16). According 
to the Australian Government (2009), monitoring is important to ‘…ensure that the education agent’s 
knowledge about your institution and courses is current; identify areas where the agents’ knowledge 
requires updating/ amendment; and detect any inappropriate practices’ (p. 7). The specific monitoring 
techniques proposed across all the documents are listed in Table 3. The content analysis shows that the 
most common monitoring mix in the best practice guidelines consists of customer feedback, field audits 
and data analysis. Other strategies, such as marketing material audits, peer sharing and mystery 
shopping, are rarely, if at all, mentioned.  
First, all the guidelines mention application and student data analysis, including at least basic examples 
as of what to monitor, such as the number of applications and students recruited. Also, the ability to 
recruit for a diverse number of academic programmes is proposed (VTI, 2010, p. 17). Most guidelines go 
beyond nominal quantities and propose conversion percentages for assessing the quality of applications 
as well as the quality and suitability of the recruited students. For instance, AIRC (2016) document 
outlines that client institutions should ‘measure the successes of agency recruited students, including 
persistence rates (retention), academic success (GPA; graduation rate), and personal success 
(engagement, leadership)’ (2016, p. 18). In line with this advice in the guidelines, the second layer 
documents report the use of diverse metrics, such as the number of applications, conversions, visa 
refusal rates and the quality of students (e.g. graduation/ persistence rates).  
These data allow providers to draw a fairly comprehensive picture of agent effectiveness and identify 
certain issues of mis/disinformation, for instance by examining transferral and success rates. However, 
in most guidelines a more systematic description of the metrics, including the exact aspects/s of agent 
behaviour they help monitor would be warranted. Similarly, the guidelines could more explicitly 
describe best practices in benchmarking, such as regional agent-to-agent comparisons (e.g. VTI, 2010) or 
the success of agent-recruited students versus non-agent recruited students over-time (AIRC, 2016; 
West & Addington, 2014) to identify underperformance. 
Second, field-audits as a monitoring tool are mentioned in all the guidelines. The objectives of these 
visits range from vague descriptions, such as obtaining ‘a first-hand understanding of how they operate’ 
(NZQA, n.d., p. “managing risks” section), to specific ideas such as ensuring that ‘up-to-date information 
is displayed by Agent’ (VTI, 2010, p. 21), or ‘determining the agents’ level of knowledge of your courses 
and campuses’ (Australian Government, 2009, p. 5). Field audits are also reported as a frequently used 
strategy by education providers in the second layer of documents. 
Field audits may be useful in identifying situations of misinformation or in determining the suitability of 
the premises and/or friendliness of the service (c.f. Coco, 2015). However, language and cultural 
differences can impede an institutional representative’s ability to observe whether what is being told to 
the student is correct or not (Galbraith & Brabner, 2013, p. 9), or whether the service can be considered 
‘friendly’ or ‘appropriate’ in the given cultural context. Neither are field audits a reliable tool for 
identifying situations of intentional misleading/sharing of unfavourable information as the agent’s 
normal behaviour may differ from what is demonstrated during the inspection. Further, one of the 
Australian reports specified that many staff who visit agents might ‘do so under the pretence of 
inspecting operations but mainly aim to maintain and strengthen the relationship to ensure the agent 
continues to direct students to the university’ (ICAC, 2015, p. 20). Hence, t this form of monitoring 
appears highly dependent on the objectives and competencies of the person conducting the visit. 
Ideally, all the best practice guides should clearly elaborate the potential monitoring aspects of these 
visits (e.g. systematic guidelines) and the competencies required for becoming a field auditor.  
Third, regular contact is frequently mentioned in the guidelines. However, this contact is predominantly 
framed as a best practice tool in training or measuring agent engagement (VTI, 2010). For instance, the 
NACAC (2014) guide outlines that it ‘is important to commit to regular and frequent communication 
with agency partners throughout the duration of a contractual relationship. One can mitigate the risk of 
misrepresentation by being proactive and responsive via email or phone’ (p. 15). Here, communication 
is presented as a risk-avoidance strategy, rather than as a tool to identify unwanted behaviour. The 
second layer of documents similarly discuss regular contact as a tool to sustain the overall relationship 
and less as a systematic monitoring measure.  
However, talking to agents can be an efficient tool to test agents’ knowledge of study opportunities and 
other destination country-related arrangements (e.g. VTI, 2010). That said, for the same reasons as 
identified in the field audit section, regular contact appears mainly useful for monitoring misinformation 
or limited engagement, rather than disinformation or other type of misconduct. In many of the guides, 
regular communication is described as a one-directional process (i.e. an opportunity for the client to 
distribute information to the agent). For example, the Australian Government (2009) guide encourages 
regular contact with agents ‘so that they are promptly informed of any changes to your institution’s 
arrangements’ (p. 4). However, to serve as an efficient monitoring tool, the guidelines should define 
constant contact as a two-directional process, where the likelihood of misinformation is evaluated by 
questioning the agents and identifying gaps in their knowledge. 
Fourth, student feedback is specified in all the guidelines as a monitoring tool. Student feedback is 
mentioned in all its forms, such as self-reported complaints, focus groups, informal/formal interviews 
and surveys. The guidelines propose that student feedback should be actively collected, and education 
providers should not wait for self-reporting of complaints by the students. For instance, the Australian 
Government (2009b) report outlines that institutions can ‘survey students on commencement regarding 
the accuracy, usefulness and comprehensiveness of the information received from education agents’ (p. 
5) and according to Scoby  (2017) ‘student’s satisfaction level is a good indicator of whether or not the 
agent represented and promoted the institution accurately’ (p. 197). Fewer guides emphasise the need 
to gather feedback from other stakeholders, such as parents (NZQA, 2016; Queensland Government, 
2009). Customer feedback is also frequently cited category in the second layer of documents, indicating 
a similar range of sub-tools and objectives for collecting student feedback. However, some providers 
seem to rely only on self-reported complaints, rather than actively surveying students. 
Student feedback can potentially help identify problems with agents’ knowledge, transparency, the 
quality of service (e.g. friendliness), financial conduct (e.g. any fees charged) and subcontracting 
arrangements (c.f. Australian Government, 2009b; Coco, 2015; VTI, 2010). However, the guidelines fail 
to mention that the reliability of this feedback may be compromised by various factors, such as language 
skills, recall bias and bounded rationality. Students or family members with limited English proficiency 
may not be able to fully understand the questions or communicate their experiences (Coco, 2015). Few 
guidelines suggest that surveys should be translated to collect information (NZQA, n.d.), and most do 
not address recall bias (i.e. feedback collected a fairly long time after the service has been provided) or 
bounded rationality, such as student limited ability to evaluate the responsibilities of the agents or the 
extent to which they have been misled/misinformed.  
Coco (2015) argues that ‘in many (and some would argue most) cases, students may have no idea that 
institutions and agencies are working together, and therefore may not fully understand the financial 
exchanges and the conflict of interest that can possibly occur’ (p. 86.). Even if education providers clarify 
these expectations before the feedback is collected, many aspects may still be difficult for students to 
disclose – such as whether more suitable study destinations/providers were available elsewhere. A 
longitudinal approach (e.g. Coco, 2015) may mitigate this issue somewhat, such as surveying students 
later when they have a better understanding of the suitability of the institution. Also, most documents 
focus on surveying of enrolled students, only a few suggesting surveying of applicants (Di Maria, 2014; 
Raimo et al., 2015) which offer an important additional perspective. Likewise, institutions are given no 
advice on how to access non-customers (i.e. students who visited the agent but did not apply). These 
limitations and a clear explanation of the use of the sub-tools recommended (e.g. timing, language, tool) 
should be covered in the best practice guides. 
Fifth, only half the guidelines and one of the second layer documents cite auditing of agent-produced 
marketing materials, such as agent brochures and websites2, as a monitoring tool. The VTI (2010) guide 
mentions the need to inspect whether the institution’s unique identification number has been included 
in ‘all written materials and those in electronic form’ (p. 88). A further review of 15 education agents’ 
websites, representing a majority of the well-known Australian research universities, revealed that only 
four of the agents have included this required CRICOS identification code on their websites.3 This casts 
significant doubts on the actual marketing audit processes employed by many providers. A review of 
relevant marketing materials would allow education providers to assess how the agent portrays the 
client institutions and the accurateness of the information provided, e.g. description of the destination, 
fees and transparency. Hence, marketing audit should be increasingly emphasised as part of the 
monitoring mix with a clear explanation of it proper use and objectives.  
Sixth, the peer review method is mentioned only once in the guidelines, in the form of ‘a common 
process via a group of signatories who share the same agents’ (NZQA, 2016, p. 8). Professional 
certifications of agents are mentioned in most guidelines as an agent selection criterion excluded from 
this study. However, it is good to note that some of these certifications provide information about the 
ongoing behaviour of agents (e.g. any complaints or deregistrations). Also, the second layer documents 
suggest that peer sharing is used, formally or informally, by many providers (Coco, 2015; Coffey & Perry, 
2013; ICAC, 2015; O’Connel, 2012; Raimo et al., 2015). For instance, in the study by Coffey and Perry 
(2013), one of the respondents notes that ‘increasingly, we do have these kinds of [conversations 
occurring] … Canadian institutions have to work together and advise their peers when they’ve had a bad 
experience. I think that will increasingly have to happen’ (p. 35).  
Peer communication can be an efficient method to communicate a diversity of agent behaviour related 
issues across the sector. At best, it should be facilitated through reliable third parties, such as 
professional organisations or government agencies. For instance, the Australian and New Zealand 
governments have promoted this type of industry-wide sharing of agent performance (Crace, 2018; 
Department of Education and Training, 2017; Immigration New Zealand, n.d.) The limitation of this 
method though is its secondary nature; in other words, one of the principals will still need to identify 
these issues by using primary monitoring techniques. However, sharing appears a useful tool for 
identifying many types of issues in agent behaviour, and therefore, should be more clearly emphasised 
in all the guidelines as part of the monitoring mix. 
Finally, mystery shopping is not listed as an approach in any of the best practice guidelines, though 
many studies indicate its suitability for identifying diverse issues when working with third parties (Dant 
& Nasr, 1998; Jacob et al., 2018; Utgård, Nygaard, & Dahlstrom, 2015). Also, its benefits compared to 
customer surveys have been outlined in research (e.g. Finn & Kayandé, 1999; Gómez et al., 2011). Only 
one of the second layer document mentions mystery shopping, adding that only few respondents 
reported employing it (Raimo et al., 2015, p. 22). A further electronic search returned one conference 
paper proposing this tool for education providers (Pattingale, 2007) as well as its use by investigative 
journalists (Newell & Watt, 2012; The Telegraph, 2012). A well-designed mystery shopping framework, 
                                                          
2 Some of the guidelines covered this in their due diligence sections. To be included in the marketing audit 
category, a systematic content audit of agent-produced marketing materials was required.  
3 Australian legislation requires all marketing materials promoting courses to international students to include the 
provider’s unique Commonwealth Register of Institutions and Courses for Overseas Students code (CRICOS). The 
education agents were identified from the website listings of Australian Group of Eight universities. The random 
sample included agents from South America, India, China, Europe, and South Africa.  
i.e. hiring people posing as prospective students to sit through the student counselling and application 
processes, can allow client institutions to determine diverse types of agent behaviour, including fees 
charged, transparency, quality of service provision, mis/disinformation and aspects of internal processes 
(e.g. the speed of application processing). Moreover, as mystery shopping allows control over both the 
questions asked and the characteristics of the ‘dummy’ students, education providers can have the 
hitherto unavailable opportunity of monitoring the treatment of non-customers (i.e. the students 
deciding not to apply to the client institution). Given the monitoring gaps and limitations of student 
surveys, mystery shopping seems to be underutilised as a control approach. 
  
5 Discussion: a way forward  
 
The analysed best practice guides recommend monitoring techniques that allow for a sound overview of 
the quantity and quality of students recruited and a few other aspects of agent behaviour, such as 
misinformation and suitability of the office premises. However, there are significant drawbacks - even if 
all the recommended monitoring techniques were employed at once, some aspects of agent behaviour 
would remain hidden from the client institution (Table 4). This section discusses these key monitoring 
gaps and evaluates the extent to which deviation in agent behaviour can be identified in these 
situations.  
The reviewed best practice documents provide limited advice on how to monitor agent misconduct that 
predominantly breaches the interests of client institutions, such as attempts at manipulating the 
application process, or unauthorised subcontracting. The available advice mainly focuses on pertinent 
ways to mitigate risks, such as proposing rules for communication, contracts and the application 
process. However, all client institutions should identify suitable procedures to determine this type of 
unwanted behaviour. Besides employing internal and external verification practices (c.f. ICAC, 2004; 
Pattingale, 2007), the use of mystery shopping appears to be a necessary primary tool for identifying a 
range of issues, such as any manipulation of documents or disclosing unfavourable information. Further, 
the peer monitoring process can help in sharing knowledge of this type of misconduct across the sector. 
The best practice guidelines should strongly emphasise these strategies, allowing clients to learn from 
each other and strengthen their own monitoring practices to mitigate unwanted behaviour. 
Similarly, the existing best practice guidelines fail to explain how education providers can efficiently 
monitor the agent’s internal processes and the verbal information disclosed to students. More 
specifically, the information disclosed to non-customers, i.e. students visiting education agents but 
deciding not to apply to the client institution, has hitherto remained unmonitored. Again, the mystery 
shopping tool seems appropriate for a reliable observation of education agent behaviour in this context.  
Gomez (2011) emphasises the limitations of mystery shopping by reminding that ‘some operational 
procedures are not carried out in the presence of clients (e.g. the manipulation of inputs in the kitchen 
of a restaurant)’ (p. 720). In the education agent context, internal procedures that are not easily 
observable by institutional clients or dummy customers are the treatment of documents and 
information collected (e.g. confidentiality of data), the training given to counsellors or the time used to 
address customer-related problems. The only way for education providers to access some of this 
internal agent-specific information might be to hire staff who have worked for education agencies – a 
method that is unlikely to lend itself to large-scale monitoring.  
Education providers may not be easily able to enjoy the benefits of plural forms sometimes used in the 
franchising context (Bradach, 1997; Kidwell & Nygaard, 2010): yet, by running their own agencies in 
some of the key markets, client institutions would increase their ability to control their external agents. 
Kidwell and Nygaard (2010) argue that ‘…an organization that rests fully on contracts with external 
agents to represent its brand capital in the market distances itself from customers and thus gradually 
loses competence in how to contract its franchisees without knowledge of the business, technology, 
markets, consumer preferences etc.’ (p. 19). 
These insights are equally applicable to education provider – agent relationships, and emphasise the 
importance of the internal competencies of the education provider. As these types of plural forms are 
unlikely to be feasible for most providers, then the competencies and time allocation of the staff 
members (e.g. their language skills and knowledge of the countries and a feasible number of agents per 
staff member) will play an important role in the effectiveness of any monitoring strategies.  
The level of motivation for increasing monitoring activities to ensure more ethical behaviour is likely to 
differ considerably across education providers (Nikula & Kivistö, 2017). For instance, in Australia, the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption concluded that ‘unfortunately, a number of universities 
continue to accept applications from any agent, regardless of whether they have a formal contract with 
the university or appropriate training and/or expertise’ (ICAC, 2015, p. 23). Education providers will 
weigh the pros and cons of new monitoring techniques, such as the additional costs, and the trade-offs 
between financial gains and compliance requirements or other operational values. 
Conclusions 
This article examined monitoring in education provider-education agent relationships under asymmetric 
information. The literature search revealed that few best practice guidelines discussing monitoring 
techniques in any detail are currently available. Comprehensive guidelines with practical advice should 
be developed as a priority by government agencies or other national level organisations in all countries 
where education providers contract agents.  
The second concern is the content covered in the existing guidelines. Even though the guidelines 
emphasised the importance of monitoring, they failed to provide sufficient advice on how to (in-effect) 
achieve the monitoring objectives. In other words, the proposed monitoring practices were not deemed 
sufficient to capture the true nature of agent behaviour. This paper proposed mystery shopping as a 
new-to-the-industry technique to better detect agents’ true behaviour. Mystery shopping, as part of the 
overall monitoring mix, can be considered as a significant step forward in identifying some of the 
hitherto hidden aspects of agent behaviour. The effectiveness of the existing monitoring practices 
employed by some education providers was also questioned, and the urgent need for a more systematic 
approach was identified. A more comprehensive description of the use and limitations of the different 
tools should be included in all the best practice guidelines.  
Nevertheless, even with the use of a comprehensive set of tools, some areas are likely to remain hidden 
from the client institutions. For instance, an understanding of many of the internal processes would 
require an insider perspective. Therefore, it may be unrealistic to assume that agents’ true behaviour 
can be fully detected. The effectiveness of other incentives, such as contracts and commissions, has 
been similarly challenged in the extant literature. If agent engagement is to be continued, the education 
providers (and pertinent regulative bodies) must accept that no monitoring tools can fully reveal agents’ 
true behaviour. However, through a systematic employment of the proposed monitoring tool mix, 
education providers can achieve a deeper understanding of their agent behaviour.  
Further research should undertake a similar review of best practice guidelines in other countries and 
interview education providers and their agents on their perspectives of efficient monitoring and the 
related barriers. Moreover, a similar analysis of other dimensions of education agent management, such 
as selection, contracting, and training would further improve the understanding of best practices in this 
industry.  
 




Identified problems Examples of the identified problems 
Students • Misinformation  
• Disinformation 
• Financial fraud/misconduct 
• Limited transparency 
• Other type of unprofessional service  
• Accidental misleading/incomplete information 
• Intentional misleading  
• Double dipping without consent, stealing money 
• Not disclosing the terms of representation  
• Unfriendliness, pushiness, delays, limited 
confidentiality of information 
Client 
institutions 
• Unfavourable information 
• Limited effectiveness 
• Manipulating the application process 
• Other significant misconduct 
• Negative information about the client institution  
• Low number of (quality) applications/students 
• Document fraud, writing personal statements 
• Sending invoices on wrong grounds, unauthorised 
sub-contracting, leaking sensitive information 
Sources: Altbach & Reisberg, 2013; Australian Government, 2010; Bridge Education Group, 2016; Coco, 2015; 
Coffey & Perry, 2013; Di Maria, 2014; Galbraith & Brabner, 2013; Guest & Gregory, 2017; Huang et al., 2016; ICAC, 
2004, 2015; Marcus, 2013; Marsh, 2016; Newell & Watt, 2012; Pattingale, 2007; PhillipsKPA, 2005; Productivity 
Commission, 2015; Raimo et al., 2015; Reisberg & Altbach, 2011; Roy, 2017; Stecklow & Harney, 2016; Tamar, 
2008; Tan, 2015; West & Addington, 2014 
Misinformation includes any situation where wrong or incomplete information is accidentally given to students. 
This may occur because of lack of effort to acquire the right information, incomplete training or misunderstanding 
(c.f. Huang et al., 2016; ICAC, 2015; PhillipsKPA, 2005). On the other hand, disinformation refers to intentional 
misleading of students (e.g. false information about costs or false promises of guaranteed admissions or work 
opportunities) or misrepresenting the quality of the course or client institution (Galbraith & Brabner, 2013; Huang 
et al., 2016; ICAC, 2015; Roy, 2017). Agents may also charge students fees against the instructions of the client 
institutions or engage in other type of financial misconduct, such as stealing tuition fee payments (Galbraith & 
Brabner, 2013; Guest & Gregory, 2017; Tan, 2015). Limited transparency refers to situations where students are 
not made aware of the role and responsibilities of the agent or their relationship with the client institution (Roy, 
2017; Tamar, 2008). The final category, other unprofessional service, pertains to the quality of service, such as 
friendliness, pushiness, the speed of communication/application processing from the agent’s side or confidential 
treatment of student data (c.f. Galbraith & Brabner, 2013; Huang et al., 2016; Roy, 2017). 
 
An agent might disclose unfavourable information about an education provider because of poor financial 
incentives or other reasons (such as more burdensome application process) to encourage students to apply to or 
accept an offer at his/her other partner institutions (Australian Government, 2010; Di Maria, 2014). Sometimes 
these might be better suited for the student in the first place, but this example would often also breach the 
interests of the students. Most of the other breaches of the education provider’s interests do not go against the 
(direct) interests of the students. Limited effectiveness refers to issues with the number and/or the quality of 
applications and students recruited (Huang et al., 2016). Attempts to manipulate the application process might 
involve document fraud or writing of personal statements or recommendation letters on the behalf of the student 
(Bridge Education Group, 2016; Galbraith & Brabner, 2013; ICAC, 2015; Marcus, 2013; Marsh, 2016; Newell & 
Watt, 2012; Stecklow & Harney, 2016). Other misconduct covers diverse types of unwanted behaviour, such as 
leaking commercially sensitive information, unauthorised subcontracting, or attempts at financial fraud, such as 
trying to send commission invoices on wrong grounds (Australian Government, 2010; Di Maria, 2014; Huang et al., 
2016; Pattingale, 2007; PhillipsKPA, 2005). 
 
NOTE: One incident of misconduct may be placed in multiple categories. This paper focuses on education provider 
– contracted agent relationships, and hence other agent related issues identified in the literature were excluded 
from Table 1. For instance, subverting the visa process (Coco, 2015; Coffey & Perry, 2013; Galbraith & Brabner, 
2013; PhillipsKPA, 2005) was categorised primarily to breach the interests of the destination country as a whole 
(Nikula & Kivistö, 2017). Also excluded were agent-to-agent disputes (e.g. Huang et al. 2016), or issues with 
uncontracted agents, such as poaching of students (e.g. (Australian Government, 2010; Ross, 2016) or 
unauthorised agents claiming to represent a provider (Pattingale, 2007).  
 
Table 2. Description of the reviewed documents  
 Source Country Description 




Australia Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations’ guide to 
‘support Australian education and training providers in their use of 




Australia Department of Education and Training published guide for the vocational 
sector to ‘provide examples on recognized industry best practice in 
international education agent management’ (p. 3) (41 pages) 
3 Victorian TAFE 
International 
{VTI}, 2010 
Australia Industry body’s guide for the technical and further education sector as ‘a 
practical guide for members to refer to when dealing with Agents’ and to 
‘ensure all members have adequate systems in place’ (p. 4). (99 pages) 
4 NZQA, 2016, n.d.  New 
Zealand 
New Zealand Qualification Authority’s {NZQA} ‘broad advice’ for all 
providers recruiting international students to ‘establish practices that 
meet the legislative outcomes’ (p.4). (43 pages plus a website resource) 




Industry body’s document outlining its members’ perceptions (i.e. not 
official AIRC guidelines) of the baseline and best practices (p. 2) to ‘assist 
institutions in their own development and best practice’. (p. 2) (42 pages) 
(APA: American International Recruitment Council, 2016) 




Industry body’s guide for schools, colleges and universities to ‘assess their 
readiness to develop or continue partnerships with these enterprises 
{education agents} and to enhance their quality’ and to help ‘mitigate risks 
inherent in the activity’ (p. 4) (23 pages) (APA: West & Addington, 2013) 




Industry body’s report authored by David L. Di Maria for “sharing basic 
information and tips related to successfully managing relationships with 
recruitment agencies” (p. 1) (10 pages) (APA: Di Maria, 2014) 
8 NAFSA, 2017 United 
States 
Industry body’s book chapter authored by Stephanie Scoby advising  
institutions wanting to partner with agents (16 pages) (APA: Scoby, 2017) 
Second layer of documents reporting on existing practices 
9 Raimo, Humfrey, 
& Huang, 2015 
United 
Kingdom 
The report was financially supported by the British Council and is available 
on the British Council website. The report aims to conduct a ‘review of UK 
universities approaches to agent relationships’ based on findings from 
qualitative interviews (p. 3). (31 pages). Findings of the study have also 
been published in an academic journal article (Huang et al. 2016) 
10 Coffey and Perry, 
2013  
Canada Report written as part of contract with the Council of Ministers of 
Education based on a survey and interviews with providers to offer a ‘scan 
of agent use in Canada’s education systems’ (p.5) (90 pages)  
11 Coco, 2015 United 
States 
Doctoral dissertation based on a case study of four higher education 
institutions to explore the ‘practice of utilizing agent as an international 
recruitment strategy in a United States context’, including aspects such as 
the assessment of these relationships (p. 11) (217 pages) 
12 O’Connell, 2012 Australia Doctoral dissertation based on interviews with staff from eight Australian 
universities examining the ‘governance mechanisms … adopted by 
universities to obtain a more productive and sustainable working 
relationship with the education agents’ (p. 24) (387 pages) 
13 ICAC, 2015 Australia Independent Commission against Corruption (New South Wales) produced 
report covering ‘what actions universities in NSW can take in order to 
manage the corruption risks created by their international student 
business’ (p. 5) based on interviews with all publicly-funded universities in 
New South Wales and other stakeholders. (30 pages) 
 
 














Best practice guidelines 
1 X X (X) X   X 
2 X X (X) X    
3 X X (X) X   X 
4 X X (X) X  X X 
5 X (X) (X) X    
6 X X (X) X    
7 X (X) (X) X    
8 X X (X) X  X  
Second layer of documents 
9 X (X) (X) X X X X 
10 (X) (X) (X) X  X  
11 X X (X) X  (X)  
12 X X (X)   X  
13 X X (X)   X  
Note: X = mentioned; (X) = mentioned, but not as an explicit monitoring tool 
Note: In certain instances, examples of relevant categories were identified, but with a vague (if any) link to 
monitoring. For example, the Australian Government (2009) recommends education providers to ‘keep regular 
contact with your education agents so that they are promptly informed of any changes to your institution’s 
arrangements’ (p. 4). This does not implicitly constitute a monitoring technique, as the objective of the contact is 
to distribute information, not collect it. The ‘other’ category included methods such as talking to all internal 




















Misinformation X X X X X X X 
Disinformation X   X XX X X 
Financial 
misconduct 
   X XX X  
Limited 
transparency 
   X XX X X 
Unprofessional 
service 
 X  X X X  
Unfavourable 
information 
X    XX  X 
Limited 
effectiveness 
XX       
Manipulation of 
documents 
    XX X  
Other misconduct 
(see Table 1) 
X   X  X  
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